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Introduction* 
This chapter discusses some of G.E.M. Anscombe’s contributions to the philosophy of 
practical reason. In particular, it focuses on her account of what it is to act for reasons. The major 
work in developing this account takes place in Anscombe’s incredibly rich monograph Intention, 
though I will also draw on insights contained in her later writings. 
Anscombe’s Intention is widely considered a foundational text in contemporary philosophy of 
action. Frederick Stoutland writes in his introduction to a volume of essays on Intention that it 
“definitely established philosophy of action as a distinctive field” (2011, p. 5). Anscombe’s work has 
also had some influence in the philosophy of practical reason. However, it has not received nearly as 
much uptake there as it has in the philosophy of action. And even when Anscombe is cited in work 
on practical reason, it is often only in passing.1 And on the subject of acting for reasons in particular, 
the depth of Anscombe’s contributions are often overlooked by philosophers of practical reason.2 As 
I will discuss later, some of this may be due to the mistaken view that her contributions have been 
largely superseded by those of Donald Davidson and his followers.  
 
*I owe thanks to Ruth Chang, Jack Samuel, and Eric Wiland for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this 
chapter.  
1 For example, Dancy’s (2000) Practical Reality cites Anscombe only in passing, despite the fact that Anscombe’s views are 
highly congenial to Dancy’s rejection of Davidson’s view of acting for reasons. For further evidence of such a trend, see 
footnotes 17 and 18. Notable exceptions, however, are Vogler (2001) and Wiland (2012, ch. 7). Wiland’s chapter, in 
particular, is one of the few dedicated to Anscombe on reasons.    
2 This is not to say that philosophers have completely overlooked Anscombe on acting for reasons. Philosophers of action 
– Anscombeans especially – often discuss her views thereof in the context of her overall theory of action (see, for instance, 
Thompson (2008), Wiseman (2016) and Ford (2017)). My concern is that work done by philosophers of practical reason 
that is in the first instance about acting for reasons has overlooked Anscombe. This is what I will attempt to begin to remedy, 
and for this reason I will not focus on reconstructions of Anscombe’s overall theory of action by philosophers of action. 
Thanks to Jack Samuel for suggesting I clarify this.  
 I will not attempt to address in a single short chapter all of the rich contributions made by 
Anscombe (in Intention and elsewhere) to the philosophy of practical reason. Instead, I will focus on 
giving an opinionated introduction to what her work says about acting for reasons, and how it can 
inform current theorizing on the matter. As I will show, Anscombe’s views cut deeply against much 
of the current orthodoxy on acting for reasons, and are worth taking more seriously in the philosophy 
of practical reason.   
For Anscombe, the question ‘what is it to act for reasons?’ is intimately related to the question 
‘what is it to act intentionally?’. I will begin by discussing that relationship. I will then further explicate 
Anscombe’s view by discussing her rejection of two related views about acting for reasons: causalism 
(the view that reasons are a kind of efficient cause of actions) and psychologism (the view that reasons 
are mental states like desires and beliefs). In the process, I will try to show that Anscombe’s rejection 
of these two views does not leave us with mystery, but rather sheds light on an interesting, heterodox 
account of acting for reasons. 
 
1. Intentional Action and Acting for Reasons 
Anscombe argues in Intention that what distinguishes actions that are intentional from those 
that are not is that intentional actions are those “to which a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ is 
given application.” This is the sense in which “the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting” (1957, 
p. 9).3 We can already see here the intimate connection between acting intentionally and acting for 
reasons. It is even tempting to assume, based on this remark, that acting intentionally and acting for 
reasons are just the same thing for Anscombe. But this would be a faulty assumption, for the 
 
3 Throughout this chapter, all quotations from Anscombe are from Intention unless otherwise noted.  
applicability of the special sense of ‘Why?’ is broader than the set of cases where the agent acts for 
reasons.4 
This is because Anscombe’s question ‘Why?’ applies in the relevant sense even in cases where 
the answer to the question is ‘no particular reason.’ As she says, “the question is not refused application 
because the answer to it says that there is no reason, any more than the question how much money I 
have in my pocket is refused application by the answer ‘None’” (p. 25). On her view, acting 
intentionally is necessary but not sufficient for acting for a reason. So, acting intentionally cannot be 
the same thing as acting for a reason.5 
In what cases, then, does the question ‘Why?’ fail to apply in the relevant sense? Anscombe 
discusses three circumstances where it fails to apply. Since these are circumstances in which one fails 
to act intentionally, they are also circumstances in which one fails to act for a reason. The first 
circumstance is when the answer is to the effect of ‘I didn’t know I was doing that.’ To respond 
(sincerely) as such is to refuse application to the special sense of the question ‘Why?’. For example, 
imagine I am spraying grass killer on my lawn, thinking it is weed killer. You, knowing that it is grass 
killer, ask me “Why are you spraying grass killer on your lawn?” and I respond, “This is grass killer!?”. 
My response refuses application to the question ‘Why?’ because it indicates that I was not aware I was 
spraying grass killer on my lawn. Correspondingly, I was not intentionally spraying grass killer on my 
lawn.  
 
4 If this is right, it raises questions about the relation between acting for no reason and arational action. One natural view 
is that if an action is done for no reason, it is thereby arational. But for Anscombe, actions done for no reason are still 
intentional. Moreover, insofar as the question ‘Why?’ is granted application, such actions are still in some sense intelligible. 
This raises the possibility that actions done for no reason are not thereby arational. While I cannot discuss this possibility 
at length here, it merits further explorations. Thanks for Ruth Chang for raising this possibility.  
5 This may not be an uncontroversial interpretation (though, to my knowledge, there is not a lot of work that directly 
addresses this question). Some of the remarks in Thompson (2008) suggest that, on his interpretation of Anscombe, acting 
for a reason and acting intentionally are coextensive. Thanks to Jack Samuel for pointing this out.  
Importantly, one might know what one is doing under some descriptions but not others. If 
you instead ask me “why are you spraying your lawn?” I might respond, “to kill these weeds over 
here.” In this case, because I am aware that I am spraying my lawn, the question has application, and 
my response specifies a reason for my action. Correspondingly, then, I might act intentionally under 
some descriptions and unintentionally under others: while I am spraying my lawn intentionally, I am 
not spraying grass killer on my lawn intentionally.6  
Although acting intentionally and acting for reasons are not the same, whether we have acted 
for some particular reason also seems to depend on the description of the action. It is unobjectionable 
to say that I sprayed my lawn for the reason that doing so would kill the weeds over there, but would 
strike us as quite odd to say that I sprayed grass killer on my lawn for the reason that doing so would 
kill the weeds over there. The latter statement makes me out to be wittingly instrumentally irrational 
when in reality I am just unaware of what I am doing. On the Anscombean view, the reasons for 
which we act stand in relation to our actions only under those descriptions under which they are 
intentional.  
The second circumstance in which the question ‘Why?’ is refused application is when, despite 
the agent’s awareness of what she is doing, her action is involuntary. As Anscombe notes, it is difficult 
to further cash out the notion of the involuntary without presupposing an account of intention. 
However, she writes, there is “a class of the things that fall under the concept ‘involuntary’ which it is 
possible to introduce without begging any questions or assuming that we understand notions of the 
very type I am professing to investigate” (p. 13). This is the class of bodily movements that are 
described in physical terms, but that one nevertheless knows without observation. Anscombe’s own 
 
6 This raises the question of whether this is really the very same action under different descriptions, or distinct actions. For 
an illuminating discussion of Anscombe’s views on this matter, see Annas (1976). See also Anscombe’s own essay “Under 
A Description” (1979).  
example is “[t]he odd sort of jerk or jump that one’s whole body sometimes gives when one is falling 
asleep.”. This is an important category to mention because for Anscombe, intentional actions are 
known without observation. However, some actions that are known without observation fail to be 
intentional because, being involuntary, the question ‘Why?’ fails to apply to them.  
The role of the Anscombean thesis that when we act intentionally, we know what we are doing 
without observation, is a fraught issue in Anscombe scholarship, and is not the focus of this chapter. 
Nevertheless, Anscombe’s account of non-observational knowledge ends up shedding important light 
on what it is to act for reasons. I will return to this issue in §3, and bracket non-observational 
knowledge for now.   
The third circumstance in which the question ‘Why?’ fails to apply is when “the answer is 
evidence or states a cause, including a mental cause” (p. 24). Imagine I say I will go for a run, and you 
ask me “Why?”. If I respond with evidence that I will run (i.e. what I take to be a reason to think I 
will run), then I am making a prediction instead of expressing an intention. By contrast, if I answer by 
giving what I take to be a reason to run, I am expressing an intention to run. One difficulty in 
interpreting Anscombe’s remarks here is the fact that she does not explicitly distinguish what we now 
call normative reasons (reasons that count in favor of doing or thinking something) from motivating 
reasons (reasons for which we act, believe, and so on). If we assume that when she writes about acting 
for a reason, the reasons she picks out best fit into the category of motivating reasons, then one 
interpretation of these remarks is that an answer to the question ‘Why?’ that specifies the agent’s 
motivating reason must give what is, from her perspective, a normative reason to act – that is, an 
answer that shows there to be something worthwhile in performing the action, rather than one that 
simply counts in favor of thinking it will happen.7 I will return to these issues in §2 when I discuss 
what makes something the reason for which one acts.  
Anscombe writes that the question ‘Why?’ fails to apply not only when the answer cites 
evidence, but also when it cites a cause. Since the question ‘Why?’ does have application when the 
answer cites a reason, this suggests that for Anscombe, reasons and causes are altogether different 
things.8 Of course, everyone theorizing about the reasons for which we act makes a distinction 
between reasons and mere causes – that is, no one thinks that just any cause of an action counts as a 
(motivating) reason for that action. Anscombe, however, is plausibly interpreted as arguing for 
something much stronger: that reasons are not causes at all. If this is right, it is one of the most 
distinctive implications her theory has about the nature of acting for reasons. So, it is to this issue that 
I now turn.  
 
2. Reasons and Causes 
 In the contemporary literature on both intentional action and acting for reasons, the standard 
story has come to be a causal story. This is, as Stoutland writes, largely owing to the influence of 
Davidson’s work on these matters: 
The majority of contemporary philosophers accept what has been called the “standard 
story” of action. That there is a standard story is largely due to Davidson, and he is 
usually said to accept it. It comes in different versions, however, many of which diverge 
from Davidson’s own view to a greater or lesser extent. What unifies them is 
commitment to the claim that an agent’s acting consists of those events that are her 
 
7 Given that Anscombe doesn’t use the terminology of motivating and normative reasons, this is not an uncontroversial 
interpretation. But I think it is a plausible one that helps to make sense of her views about how the reasons for which we 
act relate to our actions.  
8 Of course, this doesn’t entail that that which is a reason can never also be what happens to cause an action. But even if 
it did happen to cause an action, for Anscombe, this would have nothing to do with what makes it a reason. Thanks to 
Eric Wiland for suggesting I clarify this.  
bodily movements caused (in the right way) by the beliefs and desires that are her 
reasons for acting (2011, p. 12).  
 
Of course, Davidson’s own account of the reasons for which we act was a response to what he saw 
as a mistaken attack by Anscombe and others on the “commonsense” position that the relation 
between our actions and the reasons for which we act is a “species of ordinary causal explanation” 
(1963, p. 685). Davidson thought that with some refinement, he could accommodate Anscombe’s 
insights without departing from the causalist picture of acting for reasons. 
 Despite Davidson’s ambitions, Anscombe’s own views paint a picture of acting for reasons 
that is radically incompatible with causalism. As Rosalind Hursthouse writes: 
[Anscombe’s picture] has been obscured by the prominence of the current causal 
theory according to which intentions are antecedent events which explain intentional 
action. Indeed I have found in discussion that some people, perhaps misled by 
Davidson's many acknowledgments of Intention's insights, assume that all the book 
contains of value is some gropings towards the theory he has been developing since 
Actions, Reasons and Causes. But nothing could be further from the truth. Intention stands 
as an account of intentional action totally opposed to any causal account and not in 
need of radical development or improvement (2000, p. 83).  
 
In light of Davidsonian dogma, Anscombe’s views about acting for reasons have become deeply 
heterodox. And my sense is that Hursthouse was right to claim that these views have been 
underappreciated and underexplored by those who dismiss out of hand the possibility of a non-causal 
picture of acting for reasons.  
For Anscombe, to act for a reason is not for one’s action to be caused (in the right way) by 
one’s beliefs and desires. In fact, acting for reasons is not a matter of mental causation at all. The 
reasons for which we act, on her view, are neither mental states nor causes. In later work, she chalks 
the Davidsonian view up to a “failure of percipience” owing to “the standard approach by which we 
first distinguish between ‘action’ and what merely happens, and then specify that we are talking about 
‘actions’” (2006b, p. 111). To be fair, causalism’s status as dogma is due not just to the shortcomings 
of Davidsonians, but also the apparent opacity of the non-causalist picture. After all, Anscombe is 
reluctant to give a definitive statement of what she thinks it is to act for reasons. Nevertheless, her 
view can be reconstructed in a way that is not only of exegetical interest, but demonstrates the 
seriousness of her brand of non-causalism.9 
Most illuminating of her views on reasons versus causes, perhaps, is Anscombe’s discussion 
of ‘motives’ (which she seems to take as interchangeable with ‘reasons for action,’ in the sense of 
motivating reasons) and the contrast she draws with mental causes. Anscombe identifies mental causes 
as “what someone would describe if he were asked the specific question: what produced this action 
or thought or feeling on your part: what did you see or hear or feel, or what ideas or images cropped 
up in your mind, and led up to it?” (pp. 17-18). On the causalist view, a motive just is a particular kind 
of mental cause – a mental state that causes our actions in right way to be potentially rationalizing. 
Anscombe disagrees with this view: 
Motives may explain actions to us; but that is not to say that they 'determine', in the 
sense of causing, actions. We do say: 'His love of truth caused him to ...' and similar 
things, and no doubt such expressions help us to think that a motive must be what 
produces or brings about a choice. But this means rather 'He did this in that he loved 
the truth'; it interprets his action. (p. 19)  
 
Motives, then, do not cause action. Rather, they interpret action; they make sense of it.10 They need 
not involve what went on in my mind prior the action and issued in the action. Instead, they are 
features of the action itself through which one makes sense of it, as indicated by the answers one 
would give when asked the question ‘Why?’. 
 
9 Furthermore, it demonstrates that non-causalists about reasons for action themselves should take Anscombe more 
seriously than they do, not least because she is in some sense on their side. See footnote 18 for some evidence that even 
non-causalists have not paid enough attention to Anscombe’s view of acting for reasons, despite its congeniality.   
10 Importantly, however, this should not suggest a picture where interpretation is something we ‘add’ to a prior distinct 
existence. For Anscombe, that would raise the same problems as causalism. The interpretation is not something we add 
to an action, but rather part and parcel of it. Thanks to Eric Wiland for suggesting I clarify this.  
 Anscombe’s discussion of three kinds of motives sheds further light on how motives relate to 
actions. The three kinds of motives are backward-looking motives, motives-in-general, and forward-
looking motives. Backward-looking motives are things like revenge, gratitude, pity, and remorse. In 
the context of explaining such motives, Anscombe addresses the question “why is it that in revenge 
and gratitude, pity and remorse, the past event (or present situation) is a reason for acting, not just a 
mental cause?” (p. 21). Of course, the causalist would claim that such motives are the reason for which 
we act in virtue of being mental causes of a certain sort. But Anscombe wants to show how they are 
reasons not in virtue of being mental causes of any sort. She contends that backward-looking motives 
are distinct from mental causes because they consist in the agent’s conceiving of them “as something 
good or bad, and his own action as doing good or harm” (p. 22).  
 Here we finally get something close to a statement of a condition on something’s being a 
(motivating) reason for action, because what Anscombe actually says is that an agent’s answer to the 
question ‘Why?’ is a reason for acting if in treating it as a reason he conceives of it as described in the 
quote above. This suggests that, though reasons are neither mental states nor causes, acting for reasons 
does involve the mental states of the agent.11 Indeed, it would be difficult to see how an agent could 
act for reasons without her mental states being involved in some way. Nevertheless, some 
consideration does not become one’s motivating reason by being the right kind of mental state, that 
causes in the right way, one’s action. Instead, for Anscombe, some consideration becomes one’s 
motivating reason by being represented by the agent as standing in some kind of relation to the action 
that makes sense of the action from her perspective. To answer the question ‘Why?’ by providing a 
motive-in-general, Anscombe writes, “is to say something like ‘See the action in this light’ (p. 21). 
 
11 It is worth flagging that Anscombe has qualms about the language of mental states in this context. But for my purposes 
here, it won’t be problematic to stick to that language while noting her reservations.  
Forward-looking motives, of course, simply specify future ends to which the action would be a means. 
All three kinds of motives make sense of the action from the agent’s perspective.  
 Anscombe’s discussion of motives is helpful partly because it shows us what kind of answers 
to the question ‘Why?’ reasons are supposed to be. While causalists also think of reasons as answers 
to the question ‘Why?’, they conceive of reasons as causal explainers of action, so they consider the 
question “Why?’ a request for a particular kind of causal explanation. Anscombe, by contrast, 
conceives of reasons as that which, from the agent’s own perspective, make sense of what she is doing. 
For Anscombe, the question ‘Why?” is a request not for a causal explanation at all, but a sui generis 
kind of explanation (what we might call an interpretive explanation). Of course, the causalists think 
we can give an interpretive explanation just by giving the right kind of causal explanation. As Davidson 
writes, “A reason rationalizes an action only if it leads us to see something the agent saw, or thought 
he saw, in his action – some feature, consequence, or aspect of the action the agent wanted, desired, 
prized, held dear, thought dutiful, beneficial, obligatory, or agreeable” (1967, p. 685). One way of 
casting the disagreement between Anscombe and the causalists, then, is that Anscombe is an anti-
reductionist about interpretive explanations of action. By contrast, causalists are reductionists; they 
think interpretive explanations can be reduced to a species of ordinary causal explanation.  
 Here is what we have so far. On Anscombe’s view, a reason for action is an answer to the 
question ‘Why?’ that explains her action by showing what made sense of the action from her 
perspective, whether that be a means-end relation, an interpretation of the action in some larger light, 
or some backwards-looking motive like revenge. Importantly, reasons do not explain actions by causing 
them. For Anscombe, reasons and causes stand in stark opposition. In the next section, I will try to 
say a little bit more about why she takes her view to be unassimilable to the causalist picture, as well 
as what she takes the non-causal relation between reasons and actions to be.   
 
3. Reasons as Constituents of Action 
 Anscombe is clear that on her view, neither intentions nor reasons are causes of actions. Part 
of why she is so insistent on this is that for either to be causes, they would have to be separable from 
the actions they caused. But this, in her view, leads to all sorts of problems. This is why she criticizes 
Davidson for conceiving of intentional actions as events to which we affix certain additional, extrinsic 
features, like their being caused by certain mental states. She thinks this aspect of the causal view 
subjects it to at least one fatal problem: the problem of deviant causal chains.   
 The problem of deviant causal chains is a challenge to the causalist’s ability to give an account 
of what it is for the relevant mental states to cause an action ‘in the right way.’ Consider Davidson’s 
(1973) famous example of a climber who wants to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding 
another man on a rope, and believes that loosening his grip on the rope will accomplish this. This 
belief-desire pair so unnerves the climber that he inadvertently loosens his grip on the rope. In 
this case, the belief-desire pair causes the climber’s action, but does not seem to cause it the right 
way to be his reason for action. Here is what Anscombe has to say about such examples: 
Davidson indeed realized that even identity of description of act done with act specified in 
the belief, together with causality by the belief and desire, isn’t enough to guarantee the 
act’s being done in pursuit of the end and on grounds of the belief. He speaks of the possibility 
of ‘wrong’ or ‘freak’ causal connexions. I say that any recognizable causal connexions 
would be ‘wrong’, and that he can do no more than postulate a ‘right’ causal connexion 
in the happy security that none such can be found. If a causal connexion were found 
we could always still ask: ‘But was the act done for the sake of the end and in view of 
the thing believed?’ (2006b, p. 110) 
 
So, clearly Anscombe is pessimistic about the possibility of identifying the ‘right’ causal connection, 
because in her view, no causal connection could establish that the agent acted for the sake of a 
particular end. And indeed, Davidson and his successors in the causalist tradition have struggled to 
find a satisfying solution to the problem of deviant causal chains, providing some inductive support 
for Anscombe’s pessimism.12  
 Since Anscombe rejects the causal story, we need an alternative picture of how the agent’s 
own understanding of why she is doing what she is doing makes it the case that she is acting for 
particular reasons. For the causalist, the agent has some mental states that at once cause her action 
and encapsulate what she takes to favor of performing it. Thus, the problem of deviant causal chains 
notwithstanding, causalists have a picture of how the agent’s outlook on her action relates to the action 
itself. For her position to be plausible, Anscombe must have her own story about how these two 
things relate, and it must not fall prey to the very same problem that she takes to be fatal for the 
causalist.  
 Again, Anscombe is loath to offer a single, succinct statement that can be used to pin down 
her views on this matter. But her views can be reconstructed in a way that shows her non-causalism 
to be backed by a coherent metaphysics. Some of what she says in Intention may give the impression 
that she denies wholesale that any mental states or events could be relevant to a genuine interpretive 
explanation of an action, leaving it mysterious what actually renders the action intelligible from the 
agent’s perspective. But this would be a misunderstanding of her view, as some of her remarks in later 
work clarify. In “The Causation of Action,” she writes that “the teleology of conscious action is not 
to be explained as efficient causality by a condition, or state, of desire [my emphasis]” (2006a, p. 96). 
She then considers the objection that there must have been something in the agent’s mind that 
“suffused” it with intentional-ness. She responds, “Was that then a separable mental experience which 
you want to say caused the action? …in this conception a cause has to be thought of as a distinct thing, 
 
12 Even Davidson himself became a kind of defeatist about the problem (see Davidson 1973). Recently, some causalists 
have attempted to solve the problem by appealing to dispositions. For example, see Wedgwood (2006), Hyman (2014), 
and Lord (2018).  
which is found to have this effect.” The answer must be ‘no’ because the mental state must be 
“intrinsic to an action when it is intentional; or rather, definable only by the description of the 
intentional action. But such is not a cause of the action” (pp. 96-97).  
 The foregoing makes it clear that what Anscombe objects to is not the involvement of the 
agent’s mental life in any form in her action. That would be patently absurd. Instead, what she objects 
to is the reification of that mentality into a distinct existence that is then said to cause the action. And 
the problem of deviant causal chains provides principled grounds for her objection.13 So, the first 
thing that has been clarified here is that Anscombe’s rejection of the causal picture does not commit 
her to some occult view on which the agent somehow makes sense of her action without her mental 
life playing any role in explaining it.  
 Now we can finally ask: how, for Anscombe, does the agent’s mental life contribute to her 
action? And how does the agent’s understanding of why she does what she does contribute to the 
reasons for which she acts? The answers to these questions can be found in Intention itself. Here the 
role of non-observational knowledge in Anscombe’s theory of intentional action becomes relevant. 
Quoting Aquinas, Anscombe writes that we have non-observational knowledge of what we are doing 
because such knowledge is “the cause of what it understands. This stands in contrast to observational 
knowledge, which is “derived from the objects known” (p. 87). The invocation of cause in the current 
context may seem strange, since we have just recounted Anscombe’s hostility to the idea that causation 
by any mental states of the agent could be what separates intentional action from mere happenings.  
 The key here is that the term ‘cause’ in this context does not refer to the efficient causation 
we have been discussing so far. It refers instead to something like Aristotelian formal causation. As 
 
13 Anscombe also makes some interesting remarks about regresses created by the causal picture, which I don’t have space 
to discuss here.  
John Schwenkler puts it, “at the core of Anscombe’s account of action is the idea that practical thought 
is not an efficient cause that sets the visible parts of our body into motion, but the formal principle that 
unifies an action, or that in virtue of which certain physical happenings are constituted as parts of a 
person’s intentional activity” (2015, p. 6). So, for Anscombe, we have non-observational knowledge 
of what we are doing because the agent’s own understanding of what she is doing is what constitutes 
it as her action. It is in this sense that non-observational knowledge of intentional action is the (formal) 
cause of what it understands.  
 The Aristotelian distinction between efficient and formal causation has as a rough analogue in 
contemporary theorizing the distinction between causation and constitution. As such, in what follows, 
it will be helpful to contrast causation with constitution. On Anscombe’s view, our mental lives 
contribute to our actions very differently from how they contribute on the causalist picture. Our 
actions are not intentional in virtue of being caused by mental states like belief and desire. Rather, they 
are intentional in virtue of having a certain structure (of which the paradigm is a teleological structure) 
that is constituted by our very representation of it as having that structure. For example, imagine I 
wave my hand in the air in order to get your attention. What makes it the case that I wave my hand 
for the sake of this particular end? For the causalist, it is that I desired to get your attention, and 
believed that waving my hand would do so, and this belief-desire pair causes me, in right way, to wave 
my hand. For Anscombe, it is simply that in waving my hand, I understood myself as getting your 
attention.  
 Now, in such a case, we can say that my reason for waving my hand was that it would get your 
attention. This makes it clear that for Anscombe, the reason for which one acts is not a distinct 
existence from the action itself. Instead, it is part of the structure of that action. Reasons, then, are 
related to our mental states in an important way – just not in the way causalists think they are. 
Causalists think they are the mental states that cause our actions. For Anscombe, they are the contents 
of mental states through which our actions are structured. In the paradigm case of a teleologically 
structured action, the agent constitutes a particular consideration as the reason for which she acts by 
giving her action a structure where she understands it under a particular description (waving my hand) 
as a means to the end described by that very consideration (that it will get your attention).  
This identification of means and ends with reasons and actions extends throughout series of 
multiple means and ends. For example, Anscombe’s famous case where the man moves his arm, to 
operate the pump, to replenish the water supply, to poison the inhabitants. In each case, the end serves 
as the motivating reason for the action under the description of the means. And the final, non-
instrumental motivating reason in the series is the final end: to poison the inhabitants. Of course, the 
finality of the end of poisoning the inhabits doesn’t entail that the man does it for no reason. It is just 
that we must identify his reason for poisoning the inhabitants as something outside of the teleological 
structure – perhaps by providing some general or backwards-looking motive.14  
Anscombe rejects the causalist picture partly on the basis of the problem of deviant causal 
chains. She takes this problem to arise because on the causalist picture, actions and the reasons for 
which we perform them are distinct existences, and the fact that we perform an action for some 
particular reason is extrinsic to that action. On her view, by contrast, the reasons for which we perform 
an action are intrinsic to that action, and not distinct existences. This is supposed to immunize her 
view from the problem of deviant causal chains, giving it a distinct advantage over the causalist view.15 
If reasons and actions are related constitutively, not causally, there is no mystery of how the reason 
 
14 For more on this, see Stoutland (2011) on reasons that are internal to the teleological structure of an action versus those 
that are external to it.  
15 However, for an argument that non-causalists face an analogous problem, see Paul (2011) on ‘deviant formal causation.’ 
and action relate in the right way to provide the relevant kind of explanation of the action in terms of 
the reason.16  
 
4. Anscombe’s View in Context 
 As we have seen, Anscombe’s view of acting for reasons differs dramatically from what has 
become the Davidsonian orthodoxy. On Anscombe’s view, the reasons for which we act are answers 
to the question ‘Why?’ in the special sense that calls not for the causes of the action, but for the agent’s 
own interpretation of what she is doing. Furthermore, Anscombe’s discussion of motives makes clear 
that reasons for actions are not mental states, but rather those considerations that make sense of the 
action from the agent’s perspective.  
As such, Anscombe rejects two commonly held views about motivating reasons. The first is a 
view about their ontology: the view that they are mental states, which has come to be called 
psychologism.17 The second is a view about their relation to action: the view that they are causes of 
action, which I have been calling causalism. Following Davidson, almost everyone who accepts 
psychologism accepts causalism, though there is no inconsistency in accepting the former without the 
 
16 The idea that the reasons for which we act are related constitutively to our actions themselves evokes some prominent 
interpretations of Kant that also deny that reasons and actions are distinct existences. On this, see especially Korsgaard 
(2008, pp. 227-229), who writes that a reason for which one acts “is not a mental state that precedes the action and causes 
it,” but is rather “embodied in the action itself.” To my knowledge, this parallel between Kant and Anscombe has not 
been explored in depth. While it is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper, it certainly merits further exploration. 
Thanks to Ruth Chang for bringing it to my attention.  
17 Aside from Davidson, the most prominent defender of psychologism is Smith (1994, 2003). In a similar vein, Turri 
(2009) defends psychologism about believing for reasons. For arguments against psychologism that are separate from 
Anscombe’s, see Dancy (2000), Alvarez (2010, 2016), and Singh (forthcoming). O’Brien (2015) also defends a non-
psychologistic account of reasons explanations. Strikingly, however, though O’Brien engages substantially with Davidson, 
she does not even mention Anscombe.  
latter. And even those who reject psychologism often maintain causalism as the default position, 
perhaps in part because they cannot envision any plausible alternative to it.18,19  
Relatedly, epistemologists writing about the epistemic basing relation (the relation between a 
belief and the reasons for which it is held) also tend to be causalists.20 The dominance of causalism 
among both philosophers of action and epistemologists is naturally traced back to the Davidsonian 
thought that this is the only plausible way of understanding how reasons explain.21 Part of the 
importance of reconstructing Anscombe’s view, then, has been to show that this is false. Anscombe’s 
non-causalism is a contender when it comes to reasons explanations just as much as when it comes to 
intentional action. But this is something even recent non-causalists (such as Dancy and Ginet) have 
tended to overlook. Anscombe’s views thus have implications for current work not just on acting for 
reasons in particular, but on related work on the epistemic basing relation, and on the more general 
subject of reasons explanations.  
There is much more to be said about how Anscombe’s views on acting for reasons can inform 
our current theorizing; unfortunately, much of it is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, there 
is one issue I would like to discuss before concluding, and that is the issue of whether we can be 
ignorant of or mistaken about the reasons for which we act. Partly in light of recent work in psychology 
that purports to show our limited grasp of our own motivations, it has become a common view among 
 
18 For dissent, however, see Dancy (2000) and Ginet (2002). For a defense of causalism from such dissent, see Davis 
(2005). As further evidence that Anscombe’s contributions have recently been underexplored in comparison to 
Davidson’s, all of the writings just mentioned engage substantially with Davidson but cite Anscombe only in passing.  
19 Some accounts don’t take a stand on whether the explanatory relation between reasons and actions is causal. Such 
accounts, as long as they reject psychologism, are in principle compatible with Anscombe’s view. For examples, see Alvarez 
(2010, 2016) and Singh (forthcoming), the latter of which is particularly congenial to Anscombe.  
20 See, for example, Wedgwood (2006) and Boghossian (2014).  
21 For example, Wedgwood cites Davidson as providing “[t]he principal argument for regarding the basing relation as a 
causal relation” (p. 661).  
philosophers that the reasons for which we act are often not transparent to us.22 Indeed, some 
philosophers reject the idea that we have any privileged access to our motivating reasons. 
 Given her views about non-observational knowledge of what we are doing, Anscombe tends 
to be on the side of thinking that we have a very strong privileged access to facts about our actions, 
including the reasons for which we act. Anscombe’s views, then, might be accused by current theorists 
of painting an unrealistic picture of human psychology and the transparency of motivation. In light of 
this, it is worth briefly examining Anscombe’s views in light of the current consensus that our 
motivations are often opaque to us, even when we act for reasons (as opposed to mere causes).  
Anscombe addresses this issue in a passage that is less commonly discussed, but that seems to 
me to be of great interest: 
An answer of rather peculiar interest is: ' I don't know why I did it '. This can have a 
sense in which it does not mean that perhaps there is a causal explanation that one 
does not know. It goes with ‘I found myself doing it,’ ‘I heard myself say…,’ but is 
appropriate to actions in which some special reason seems to be demanded, and one 
has none… I myself have never wished to use these words in this way, but that does 
not make me suppose them to be senseless. They are a curious intermediary case: the 
question ' Why? ' has and yet has not application; it has application in the sense that it 
is admitted as an appropriate question; it lacks it in the sense that the answer is that 
there is no answer. I shall later be discussing the difference between the intentional 
and the voluntary; and once that distinction is made we shall be able to say: an action 
of this sort is voluntary, rather than intentional. (pp. 25-26).  
 
I cannot undertake a discussion of Anscombe’s distinction between the voluntary and the intentional 
here. But one thing is clear: on her view, an action fails to be intentional when the agent’s answer to 
the question ‘Why?’ is ‘I don’t know why I did it.’ For Anscombe, while this does not straightforwardly 
refuse application to the question ‘Why?’ it is not a genuine answer because it does not shed light on 
 
22 Much of this influence comes from Nisbett and Wilson (1977) and the following literature, which purports to show that 
people are prone to confabulating the reasons for which they act, and in such cases are unable to provide the ‘true’ 
explanations of their actions. For examples of such influence, see Nichols and Stich (2003), Gertler (2012), Carruthers 
(2013), and Cassam (2014). For criticism of the way Nisbett and Wilson’s results are interpreted, see Sandis (2015).   
the agent’s action from her own perspective. Given that the reasons for which one acts must be 
answers that shed such light on one’s action, it seems that on Anscombe’s view, the agent cannot have 
acted for reasons in such cases.  
 This is compatible, as she says, with there being some causal explanation of his action that he 
does not know. However, she denies that in such cases, it is possible that there is “a reason, if only he 
knew it.” Indeed, she denies that this is possible “even if psychoanalysis persuades him to accept 
something as his reason” (p. 26). This suggests that Anscombe’s view radically diverges from current 
orthodoxy on the opacity of our reasons. The case of psychoanalysis is one that many current theorists 
would view as a paradigmatic case in which one might, through self-examination, discover the reasons 
for which one performed past actions. For Anscombe, such discovery is impossible. To act for a 
reason is to act in light of a consideration that makes sense of one’s action from one’s own perspective; 
this is impossible without having access to what that consideration is. Thus, we cannot be alienated 
from our reasons in the way that it is often thought we can.  
 The divergence between Anscombe and current orthodoxy on the transparency of our reasons 
is not unrelated to the divergence between them on causalism and psychologism. On the Davidsonian 
view, the reason is not only a distinct existence from the action, but can be pulled apart from the 
agent’s own perspective. Of course, Davidson grants that the agent see something good or worthwhile 
in the action. But this too can be divorced from her perspective, for on Davidson’s view, this is just a 
matter of her beliefs and desires. So, we can be just as alienated from our reasons as we can from our 
beliefs and desires.23 To see what an agent’s reasons are, we need only discover which mental states 
caused her action, whether or not she knows what they are.24 This is not possible for Anscombe.  
 One kind of case Anscombe does not explicitly discuss – one with which theorizing about 
transparency and alienation is concerned – is a case in which an agent cites what from her perspective 
is the reason for which she acted, but from a third-personal perspective there is evidence that she is 
mistaken about why she acted. Most current theorists would want to hold that in such a case, the agent 
is indeed mistaken about the reasons for which the acted, and that it is possible that what moved her 
was some unconscious motive rather than what she cited as her reason. It seems Anscombe must 
deny the possibility of this case as well. For Anscombe, while there may be some mental cause of 
which the agent is unaware, this is irrelevant to the question of the reason for which she acts. Only 
the agent’s own understanding of her action matters. Perhaps Anscombe would attribute the claim 
that there are cases of being mistaken about one’s reasons to the erroneous assumption of causalism.25 
 Anscombe’s rejections of causalism, psychologism, and the opacity of reasons cut deeply 
against the grain of current theorizing about acting for reasons. The dominance of causalism in 
particular seems only to have strengthened since her time, perhaps in part due to the growing influence 
of empirical psychology on the philosophy of practical reason. Some will doubtless see this as further 
evidence that we should dismiss Anscombe’s views on acting for reasons as mysterious and 
 
23 It’s generally accepted that our desires can be non-transparent to us. If motivating reasons are desires or desire-belief 
complexes, then it follows that our motivating reasons can be non-transparent to us. For an example of this view, see 
Smith (1987). 
24 Indeed, given Davidson’s interpretationism, it should be possible for others to know an agent’s reasons for acting better 
than she herself does. See Davidson (1984) for more on his interpretationism. 
25 Many readers will probably find this part of Anscombe’s view harder to swallow than her rejections of causalism and 
psychologism. While I cannot undertake a full exploration of its plausibility in this paper, it is worth noting that its 
plausibility depends partly on whether recent work in psychology really has the upshot philosophers have thought it to 
have.  
unscientific. But this would be too quick. In reconstructing Anscombe’s account of acting for reasons, 
I hope to have shown that she had deep and interesting reasons for holding it. Whether or not we 
ultimately accept a view like hers, it is worth treating it as a serious alternative to the views that have 
become current orthodoxy.   
In particular, Anscombe’s insights about acting for reasons far outstrip what Davidson took 
from them, and so we do not do her justice when we theorize about acting for reasons solely through 
a Davidsonian lens. Among other things, we risk underrating the work of one of the most important 
woman philosophers of all time in favor of the contributions of one of her male peers. Contemporary 
work in the philosophy of action takes Anscombe’s work very seriously. If I have shown anything in 
exploring Anscombe’s account of acting for reasons, I hope it is that the philosophy of practical reason 
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